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Abstract: The paper based on archival, published and press sources, and relevant lit-
erature presents the ideological basis and enforcement of the Croatian policy of the 
extermination of the Serbs and Jews in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 
which had its place within the New Order of Europe. Soon after the establishment 
of the NDH in April 1941, the destruction process was partially centralised in a 
network of camps centred at Gospić. After the outbreak of a mass Serb uprising and 
the dissolution of the Gospić camp, a new and much larger system of camps centred 
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August 1941 until the end of the war. In November 1941, the mass internment of 
undesirable population groups was provided for by law, whereby the destruction pro-
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The establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna 
Država Hrvatska – NDH) was made possible by the conjunction of op-
portune political and military circumstances following the military coup 
of 27 March 1941 and the attack of Nazi Germany and its allies on the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 6 April the same year. It opened the way for 
putting in place the Croatian ultranationalist political programme which 
had been taking shape since the second half of the nineteenth century. It 
soon became obvious that the ideological profile and political practice of the 
Croatian puppet state was much closer to the German Nazi model than to 
the Italian fascist one, even though it was from Italy that a new Croatian 
king, Tomislav II, was supposed to come. 
The new state structure was set up surprisingly fast, mostly because it 
was able to rely on the administrative structures and paramilitary forces of 
the former Banovina Croatia.1 After the public appeal of the vice-president 
of the Yugoslav government, Vladko Maček, issued upon the entry of Ger-
* mbkoljanin@gmail.com
1 Banovina Croatia, an autonomous region of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with broad 
powers, was created by the agreement between the Yugoslav prime minister, Dragiša 
Cvetković, and the leader of the Croatian nationalist movement, Vladko Maček, con-
cluded on 26 August 1939.
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man troops in Zagreb, which, by the way, were hailed with enthusiasm by 
the crowd that took to the streets, the former banovina authorities placed 
themselves at the disposal of the Ustasha regime. The significant role of the 
Roman Catholic Church in the inception and policies of the new state gave 
the latter a markedly clerical character. In the predominantly agrarian Cro-
atian society, the Church’s approval or disapproval carried crucial weight on 
both individual and collective psychological levels.
The newly-established NDH encompassed not only Croatia but also 
the areas which were neither ethnically nor historically Croatian (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Srem). This is obvious from its own population cen-
sus: according to the data of the Foreign Ministry of 1 May 1941, of a 
total population of 6,290,300, Croats made up a little more than one-half 
(52.46%), while Serbs accounted for nearly one-third (1,925,000 or 30.6%). 
Muslims were officially subsumed under Croats, while Germans, Magyars, 
Czechs, Slovaks, Jews and Slovenes constituted larger minorities.2 
The archbishop of Zagreb and metropolitan bishop of Croatia Aloj-
zije Stepinac, who had been a supporter of the Croat “revolutionary move-
ment” since 1936,3 extolled the new Croatian state as a divine creation. The 
archbishop saw its inception as “God’s hand at work”, as he put it in his 
circular letter of 28 April 1941 inviting the clergy of the Diocese of Zagreb 
to set to “the blessed work of preserving and improving the NDH”.4 This 
fitted well into the Vatican’s plans for expanding its jurisdiction over the 
“schismatics”, i.e. Orthodox Christian Serbs, a goal which was supposed to 
be served by the creation of a large Croatian Catholic state.5 The annihila-
tion of the Orthodox Serb population within the boundaries of that state, 
the obliteration of their identity and of all traces of their existence was 
supported by the Roman Catholic hierarchy and clergy. Some measure of 
disagreement between the Ustasha authorities and the archbishop Stepinac 
and some other prelates, which occasionally surfaced to public notice, was 
2 Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941–1945 (Zagreb: SN 
Liber, 19782), 106.
3 Milorad Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje izmedju klanja i oranja. Istorija Srba u novom veku 
1492–1992 (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 415, 420, 423 and 431. 
4 Katolički list no. 17, 197–198; Viktor Novak, Magnum crimen. Half a Century of Cleri-
calism in Croatia. Dedicated to Unknown Victims of Clericalism, vol. II ( Jagodina: Gambit 
2011; English ed. of the book originally published in 1948), 720–721.The archbishop’s 
circular letter was broadcasted on the radio for a few days in a row either in its entirety 
or in excerpts, ensuring its messages a much wider outreach than the printed version 
could have.
5 Carlo Falconi, Il silenzio di Pio XII (Milan: Sugar Editore, 1965); Avro Manhattan, The 
Vatican’s Holocaust. The sensational account of the most horrifying religious massacre of the 
20th century (Springfield: Ozark Books, 19882), 89–104.
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the result of divergent opinions on the methods of achieving the shared 
goal, not on the goal itself.6 
As long as it was not a threat to German interests, the Croatian pol-
icy on the Serbs enjoyed Berlin’s undivided support. The Italians had no 
doubts whatsoever that orders for the destruction of Serbs were coming 
from the government itself.7 As early as 11 June 1941 the Italian 2nd Army 
reported that Catholic priests and monks had been leading murderous raids 
on Orthodox Serbs and acting as promoters of Ustasha propaganda, being 
6 Stella Alexander, The Triple Myth. A Life of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (New York: 
East European Monographs, 1987), 71–72; Jonathan Steinberg, “Types of Genocide? 
Croatians, Serbs and Jews 1941–5”, in The Final Solution. Origins and Implementation, 
ed. David Cesarani (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 183.
7 Davide Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World 
War (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 186–187.
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convinced that the Catholic faith could not rise and grow stronger unless all 
Serbs were destroyed.8
The premises of the ideology of the pre-war Ustasha terrorist organ-
isation, notably its anti-Serbian and anti-Jewish component, were promptly 
incorporated into racist policies created by the newly-established power 
structure. Those policies were pursued throughout the existence of the Cro-
atian state within the New Order of Europe. State repression was dressed 
up in a pseudo-legal form, which opened the door to conducting a policy 
at the heart of which was the idea of a homogeneous state of (Muslim and 
Roman Catholic) Croats achieved through the extermination of Serbs, Jews 
and, somewhat later, Roma, as well as of politically undesirable citizens, at 
first Yugoslav nationalists, and then communists as well.9
Immediately upon the declaration of the establishment of the pro-
Nazi puppet Croatia in 1941, public discourse became saturated with ul-
tranationalist and racist rhetoric, and targeted against two main groups: 
Serbs and Jews, though Serbs principally.10 One may therefore speak of 
two Croatian nationalist-racist policies, Serbian and Jewish. Those policies, 
although pursued simultaneously and with the same ultimate goal, had their 
distinctive features, from ideological to practical. Hence the process of stig-
matisation, social exclusion, dehumanisation, expropriation and extermina-
tion of the two national-racial groups was not entirely the same. Somewhat 
later, the annihilation project was expanded to include the Roma, with the 
exception of Muslim Roma (“white Gypsies”), the majority of whom lived 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been annexed to the Independent 
State of Croatia. 
Even though there were clear differences in the enforcement and fi-
nal outcome of the policy of annihilating the “undesirable” when it comes 
to Serbs on the one hand and Jews and Roma on the other, the key fact 
is that there was a publicly proclaimed state policy of destroying all these 
groups and that it was pursued using all available means, depending on the 
circumstances and resources. That is the reason why the Croatian policy on 
all three groups had all elements of the crime of genocide throughout the 
existence of the NDH.11 
8 Ibid. 186.
9 Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 158–184; Bogdan Krizman, NDH 
izmedju Pavelića i Musolinija (Zagreb: Globus, 19832), 117–137; Milan Koljanin, “Za-
koni o logorima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, in Jasenovac, sistem ustaških logora smrti 
(Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1996), 30.
10 Krizman, NDH, 119.
11 In the view of Tomislav Dulić, Utopias of Nation. Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 1941–42 (Uppsala University, 2005), 365, the extermination of Jews and Roma 
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The plan for the extermination of Serbs faced the Ustasha state with 
the fact that they made up about one-third of the population. Therefore, 
its putting into practice required full mobilisation of state institutions and 
resources. Besides the already existing institutions, new ones were set up 
with this as their main responsibility. The annihilation policy was carried 
out both by the Ustasha movement – its organs (central and local) and its 
military and police forces – and by administrative bodies, from the gov-
ernment and ministries down to the lower levels of public administration, 
counties and districts (velika župas and kotars respectively). The Croatian 
regular army (domobranstvo, Home Guard) and gendarmerie (oružništvo) 
were also assigned a role in the carrying out of the policy.12 This is not con-
tradicted by the fact that Croatian army officers sometimes voiced their dis-
approval of the methods used against the Serbs or by the occasional cases of 
Ustashas being disarmed by Croatian army units.13 The systematic and mass 
killing of Serbs was committed primarily by Ustasha military units (Ustaška 
vojnica) and, together with them or independently, armed civilians (“wild 
Ustasha” or Ustasha militia) led by local Ustasha officials.14 All of that was 
taking place in accordance with the general policy of destroying undesirable 
groups, and concrete actions were undertaken on orders orally transmitted 
from highest places.15
in the NDH was a genocide because a “substantial part of the population” was destroyed, 
while the case of Serbs is downplayed as an “attempted genocide” or ethnocide. On the 
other hand, Alexander Korb, Im Scatten des Weltkrieges. Massengewalt der Ustasa gegen 
Serben, Juden und Roma in Kroatien 1941–1945 (Hamburg: Hamburg Edition, 2013), 
259 and 268–269, argues that the crimes against Serbs were not a genocide and, what is 
even more shocking, that there is no evidence for a planned annihilation. 
12 More recent Croatian historiography on the Ustasha military organisation completely 
ignores this role of the movement’s military wing; see e.g. Amir Obhodjaš et al., Ustaška 
vojnica. Oružana sila Ustaškog pokreta u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941–1945, vols. 
I and II (Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2013). Works on the Croatian regular army (domo-
branstvo) are almost equally silent on its role in the destruction of Serbs, cf. Nikica 
Barić, Ustroj kopnene vojske domobranstva Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941–1945 (Za-
greb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2003), 84 and 455–459.
13 Headquarters of the Croat Legions to the Commander of the Croatian Army, Main 
Headquarters, Bosanski Novi, 5 Aug. 1941, published in Slavko Vukčević, ed., Zločini 
Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941–1945, vol. I of Zločini na jugoslovenskim prostorima 
u Prvom i Drugom svetskom ratu. Zbornik dokumenata (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski insti-
tut, 1993), 454–456; Barić, Ustroj, 455–459; Ervin Šinko, Drvarski dnevnik, ed. Ištvan 
Bošnjak (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1987), 150–151.
14 Contemporary Croatian historiography tends to ascribe the crimes against Serbs to 
the “wild Ustasha”, cf. Barić, Ustroj, 455–459.
15 “Zašto je došlo do zločina u Baić jamama”, manuscript, Papers of Petar Drakulić, 
Muzej žrtava genocida [Museum of Genocide Victims], Belgrade; Branko Vujasinović 
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Even though the methods, dynamic and means of the annihilation 
process varied, its ultimate goal was the physical destruction of the Serb 
population and of all traces of their group identity, notably its religious, 
Orthodox Christian, dimension. A series of laws banned all Serbian na-
tional symbols and institutions, followed by the seizure of their public and 
private property, followed by increasingly frequent murders.16 The first to 
bear the brunt were the cities and ethnically compact Serbian areas in the 
former Austrian Military Frontier (Lika, Kordun, Banija, west Slavonia and 
Srem), then Bosanska Krajina, Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia, i.e. the ar-
eas bordering Serbia and Montenegro. The Serb social elite was the first 
to be subjected to physical extermination. The Serbian Orthodox Church 
was outlawed, its bishops, priests and monks tortured, murdered or exiled, 
churches and monasteries systematically ravaged, their properties looted 
or destroyed. Besides priests, teachers were also seen as bearers of Serbian 
national identity and were subjected to ruthless repression. According to 
the official Croatian records of the second half of July 1941, “there still are 
2,204 male and female teachers of the Greek-Eastern [i.e Christian Ortho-
dox] faith, and the Ministry of Education suggests that they be transferred 
to concentration camps”.17 
The programme of the destruction of Serbs had a foreign policy di-
mension to it. It fitted into the Nazi German plan for an “ethnic reorganisa-
tion” of Europe aimed at the national homogenisation of the Third Reich 
and germanisation of the annexed parts of the occupied states. It was in 
keeping with that plan that Slovenes from the German-occupied part of 
Slovenia were expelled to the NDH and the German-occupied part of Ser-
bia. The conference of German and Croatian representatives held in Zagreb 
on 4 June 1941 decided on resettling (expelling) to the German-occupied 
part of Serbia, apart from Slovenes, an appropriate number of Serbs from 
the NDH.18
Croatian anti-Serbian discourse was essentially contradictory. It de-
nied the existence of the Serbian people as such on the one hand,19 while 
& Čedomir Višnjić, Glina 13. maja 1941. U povodu 70. godišnjice ustaškog zločina (Za-
greb: SKD Prosvjeta, 2011), 31.
16 Jelić-Butić, Ustaše, 158–178.
17 Vukčević, ed., Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 392–393.
18 Slobodan D. Milošević, Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–
1945. godine (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1981), 31–34; Tone Ferenc, 
Nacistička politika denacionalizacije u Sloveniji u godinama od 1941. do 1945 (Ljubljana & 
Belgrade: Partizanska knjiga, 1979).
19 That was part of Croatia’s official policy which Pavelić presented to Hitler at their first 
meeting on 6 June 1941; cf. Andreas Hillgruber, ed., Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei 
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calling for, and working on, their elimination on the other. “Theoretical” 
basis for the dehumanisation of Serbs were the allegedly insurmountable ci-
vilisational differences between the Croats, as an eminently western people, 
and the Serbs, as the embodiment of an inferior and odious “Byzantium”. 
Overt or oblique, such a discourse had become commonplace in Croatian 
public life as early as the interwar period,20 and so had the thesis about 
the Croat people being exploited, oppressed and existentially imperilled by 
“greater-Serbian” Yugoslavia and the Serbs as a whole. 
The discourse about the necessity of defending the very existence of 
the Croat people that became prevailing immediately upon the establish-
ment of the Nazi satellite state of Croatia came down to the following: 
the Croat people has been released from the unnatural and deadly political 
framework into which it was forced in 1918, and has now returned to its 
natural, civilisational, ideological and racial (Germanic) setting epitomised 
by Nazi Germany.21 Unlike the NDH, the other Slavic nations that had 
been given a place in  Hitler’s “New Order” (Bulgaria and Slovakia) neither 
denied their Slavic origin nor sought to relate themselves to a Germanic 
ancestry. Continuing the nineteenth-century legacy of Ante Starčević, the 
originator of exclusive Croat nationalism, the Croatian state widened its 
distance from the Serbs in racial terms as well.
The basic discourse was disseminated to the propaganda beat set by 
the central press, notably the daily Hrvatski narod (Croatian People). Its 
editorial of 11 April 1941 claimed that never in its glorious and turbulent 
history had the Croat people paid such a high price “in blood and wealth” as 
it had in Yugoslavia, laying the blame for that on the “centuries-old enemy”, 
the local Serb population and the Serbs in Serbia, and their helpers, and 
Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslands 1931–
1941 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag, 1967), 577; Krizman, NDH, 
48–49.
20 Milan Koljanin, Jevreji i antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941 (Belgrade: 
Institu za savremenu istoriju, 2008), 299.
21 As reported by Edmund Veesenmayer, a member of the German diplomatic staff in 
Zagreb, to the foreign minister Ribbentrop, on the occasion of his meeting with the 
designated head of the Ustasha NDH, Ante Pavelić, in Karlovac on 14 April 1941, 
Pavelić stated that he was going to prove that the “Croats are not of Slavic but of 
Germanic ancestry. And finally, he offered assurances that Hitler would not be disap-
pointed in him” (quoted after Slobodan Milošević, Nemačko-italijanski odnosi na teri-
toriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1942 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1991), 
47. At his meeting with Hitler on 21 July 1941, Slavko Kvaternik, commander-in-chief 
of the Croatian army, also insisted on a non-Slavic origin of the Croats, cf. Hillgruber, 
ed., Staatsmänner, vol. II, 612.
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driving the message home with an open threat that “the just Croat people” 
would judge them all.22
Both the anti-Serbian and anti-Jewish discourses drew on the thesis 
about the Croat people’s imperilment by the Serbs and Jews who had been 
working together against its vital interests. So, the Croat people was com-
pelled to secure its future by radically removing those threats from its body. 
Still, on the list of Croatian enemies, the Serbs held the place of honour. 
Whether communists or not, they had begun to be arrested and murdered 
even before the mass arrests of communists that ensued after 22 June 1941. 
The beginning of the “crusade” against the Soviet Union marked the begin-
ning of a large-scale internment and killing of Jews. The Jews were identi-
fied with bolshevism, one of two archenemies of humankind (the other was 
plutocracy, i.e. liberal capitalism).
The anti-Jewish discourse drew on traditional and modern anti-Sem-
itism, and so did the anti-Jewish laws, starting with the “Legal Decree on 
Racial Affiliation” and the “Legal Decree on the Protection of the Aryan 
Blood and Honour of the Croat people” which were passed on 30 April 
1941 and which were soon followed by a number of other anti-Semitic 
laws.23 Moreover, to the accusations against the Jews yet another cardinal 
sin was added: collaboration with the already demonised Serbs. Anti-Ser-
bianism/Yugoslavism and anti-Semitism had already been commonplace in 
the interwar papers of the Croatian extreme right.24 After the establishment 
of the pro-Nazi Croatia they came to dominate public discourse, from the 
printed media to public addresses of highest state officials.
The attack of Nazi Germany, its allies and satellites on the Soviet 
Union gave another strong boost to the NDH’s repressive policies towards 
the Serbs as well as the Jews. Anti-bolshevist/anti-communist discourse 
introduced then would become an essential part of anti-Serbian and anti-
Jewish policies too. The ideological label “communist” was attached not only 
to the communist opponents of the Croatian state but to all Serbs and Jews, 
be they communists and communist sympathisers or not. Therefore, from 
22 June 1941 the policy of the destruction of Serbs and Jews was pursued 
in the sign of the struggle against communism in which the Croat people 
took part both at home and, together with the other peoples of the “New 
Europe”, in the East.25 
22 Krizman, NDH, 123.
23 Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2001), 
117–124.
24 Koljanin, Jevreji i antisemitizam, 395–462.
25 Note on the conversation that Hitler and Marshal Slavko Kvaternik had at the Füh-
rer’s Headquarters on 21 July 1941, in Hillgruber, ed., Staatsmänner, vol. II, 575–580.
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The invasion of the Soviet Union led the Croatian leadership to mo-
bilise all resources for the struggle for the principles of the “New Order”. 
The Croat people was called upon to join the struggle of the great German 
nation in defence of Europe against “Jewish-bolshevist savagery”, the great-
est enemy of humankind and the Croat people. According to the Croat 
leader Pavelić’s proclamation of 2 July 1941, calling upon the people to 
take part in the struggle against bolshevism, the Croats had yet another 
important reason for joining in: “The Moscow power-holders” had made 
an alliance with the “Belgrade power-holders” so as “to prevent”, at the last 
moment, “our national liberation and save the prison of the Croat people, 
the former Yugoslavia”.26 That was a clear allusion to the Yugoslav-Soviet 
agreement signed on 5 April 1941, a day before the German and Italian 
invasion of Yugoslavia.
* * *
From the early days of Ustasha Greater Croatia there was an effort to bring 
system into the annihilation process. As far as the Serbs were concerned, 
the process began in their ethnic areas, and the countryside. Slowly but 
surely, however, an increasing number of executions were carried out in the 
newly-established system of camps. Until the end of the summer of 1941 
the elimination of the Serbian population had the form of forced resettle-
ment to the German-occupied part of Serbia, and therefore so-called re-
settlement camps for Serbs operated for a few months in Sisak (Caprag), 
Slavonska Požega and Bjelovar. Those camps were not intended for exter-
mination, but acts of torture were carried out in them on a massive scale, 
and a large number of Serbs were killed either during transportation to or in 
the camps.27 The “resettlement-to-Serbia” formula was useful in the process 
of physical elimination because it served as a pretext for concentrating Serbs 
in one place for execution.
Forced conversion of Christian Orthodox Serb population to Roman 
Catholicism was no doubt the main method of obliterating their national 
identity and of croatisation, and it was there that the symbiotic relationship 
between the Ustasha state and the Roman Catholic Church found its full 
expression. The Roman Catholic Church’s main motivation for support-
ing the Ustasha state was in that the latter was radically wiping out the 
Orthodox ecclesiastical organisation and was keenly committed to convert-
ing the Serbs to Roman Catholicism even at the cost of their large-scale 
26 Poglavnik govori, vol. 2 (Zagreb 1941), 51. 
27 Miodrag Bijelić, Sabirni ustaški logor u Slavonskoj Požegi 1941. godine (Belgrade: 
Muzej žrtava genocida, 2008). 
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physical annihilation. Members of the Catholic clergy and religious orders 
performed the conversion rite with the assistance of Croatian military or 
police forces, under the grisly shadow of mass massacres and the aggres-
sive anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox propaganda campaign. It was not by 
chance that the “Legal Decree on Conversion from One Faith to Another” 
was enacted as early as 3 May 1941.28 But the opportunity for conversion 
was not to be given to members of the Serbian social elite. In its circular 
letter of 30 July 1941, the Ministry of the Interior ordered that certificates 
of conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism not be issued to members of 
the intelligentsia, save by exception;29 and the order for their transfer to the 
camp at Gospić followed before long. This went well with the policy of the 
Roman Catholic Church not to permit conversion to those who would do it 
out of “self-interest”, alluding to the Serbs of good financial and intellectual 
standing.30
Nor was “voluntary” conversion to Roman Catholicism in itself a 
guarantee of life; sooner or later, many a “convert” ended up murdered.31 
The main criterion for applying repression was affiliation, whether current 
or former, to Orthodox Christianity. In July 1941 the Ustasha Police Direc-
torate (Ravnateljstvo ustaške policije) ordered the counties to compile, within 
fifteen days, a register not only of all local Serbs but also of all those who 
had ever been Orthodox.32 In that way, the religious-racial criterion was 
introduced into the annihilation process, because one’s Serbian descent was 
equated with one’s membership of the Orthodox Church regardless of one’s 
possible subsequent change of religion. The same criterion was applied to 
the Jews; namely, the change of religion was not enough to save them from 
annihilation. 
The outbreak of a Serbian uprising in Herzegovina in early June 
1941, and with full force in Lika and Bosanska Krajina in late July 1941, 
was a development which increasingly influenced Croatian policies. Once 
Serbian ethnic areas were liberated by the insurgents, among whom those 
of communist persuasion would prevail, the destruction process was in-
creasingly carried out under the umbrella of military actions against the 
insurgents. At first carried out by Croatian forces alone, such actions were 
28 Zbornik zakona i naredaba Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (Zagreb: Ministarstvo pra-
vosudja i bogoštovlja, 1941), 56; Narodne novine no. 19, 5 May 1941; “Uputa prilikom 
prelaza s jedne vjere na drugu”, in Zbornik zakona, 122; Narodne novine no. 37, 27 May 
1941. 
29 Vukčević, ed., Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 412–413.
30 Dulić, Utopias of Nation, 94.
31 Milan Koljanin, “Akcija ‘Diana Budisavljević’”, Tokovi istorije 3 (2007), 193–194.
32 Vojni arhiv [Military Archives; hereafter: VA], Fonds NDH, b. 179, no. 13/2-1.
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more and more often undertaken in collaboration with German and Italian 
military forces.33 
The first camps in the NDH were set up within a few days of its 
inception. Relying on those that had been established for political oppo-
nents in the former Banovina Croatia, the Ustasha authorities soon created 
an entire system of camps in which the central place was occupied by the 
one at Gospić. Apart from the facilities at Gospić itself, the camp included 
a network of provisional camps and execution sites, to mention but the 
goriest: the environs of the village of Jadovno on Mt Velebit, and Slana and 
Metajna in the island of Pag.
The Gospić concentration camp was jurisdictionally under the 
Gospić County Police Department (Župsko redarstveno ravnateljstvo), but 
its command structure was under the authority of the NDH’s central po-
lice institution, the Zagreb-headquartered Directorate for Public Order and 
Security (Ravnateljstvo za javni red i sigurnost – RAVSIGUR). In organ-
isational and executive terms, the command structure of the camp was to 
come under the authority of the central Ustasha institution, the Ustasha 
Supervisory Service (Ustaška nadzorna služba – UNS), and its 3rd Office, 
Ustasha Defence (Ustaška obrana) which was charged with setting up and 
operating camps.34 From the very inception of the NDH the camps were 
under the authority of the narrow circle of Ustasha leaders,35 which is quite 
understandable given the intended role of the camps in the pursuit of the 
Ustasha genocidal agenda. The speed and efficiency with which the camps 
were set up suggests that plans had been made even before the Ustashas 
came to power. In the early months of the NDH, camps were set up by 
one of Pavelić’s closest associates from the period of their emigration, Mijo 
Babić (“Giovanni”), a commissioner of the Ustasha Headquarters. After he 
was killed in an encounter with Serbian insurgents in Herzegovina in July 
1941, authority over the camps, and then over the 3rd Office of UNS, was 
taken over by Vjekoslav Luburić (“Max”), who remained, with a break, in 
position until the end of the NDH.36
33 Klaus Schmider, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944 (Hamburg: Mittler, 2002), 
89–98.
34 The section on the Ustasha Defence in Obhodjaš et al., Ustaška vojnica (pp. 91–99), 
makes no mention whatsoever of the operation of the camps and the Ustasha units that 
secured them.
35 Dušan Lazić, “Organizacija policijsko-obaveštajne službe ‘Nezavisne Države Hr-
vatske’. Ustaška nadzorna služba”, Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske 7 (1973), 144 and 
176–177; Mirko Peršen, Ustaški logori (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), 76.
36 Lazić, “Organizacija”, 144 and 176–177; Peršen, Ustaški logori, 76; Koljanin, “Zakoni 
o logorima”, 24–25. 
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The Ustasha Supervisory Service established under the law of 16 Au-
gust 194137 was divided into four branches: 1) Ustasha Police; 2) Ustasha 
Intelligence Service; 3) Ustasha Defence; and 4) Ustasha Personnel Of-
fice. At the head of UNS was the Ustasha supervisory commander appointed 
by and accountable to the Poglavnik (title of Ante Pavelić,  after the Nazi 
example, meaning a “leader”). The position was held by Eugen Kvaternik 
(“Dido”). Even though UNS ran affairs that fell in the purview of the police, 
it was independent of the Ministry of the Interior and answerable to Pavelić 
himself through the Ustasha supervisory commander, whereby the powers of 
Eugen Kvaternik, who had been holding the post of “director for public 
order and security for the NDH” (RAVSIGUR) since 7 May 1941, be-
came even broader. He was vested with the power to exercise control “over 
the operation of the police districts in all branches of the police service”.38 
RAVSIGUR was the central police institution of the NDH. Formally part 
of the Ministry of the Interior, it was detached from it under the law on the 
government of the NDH of 24 June 1941.39 
Since the only purpose of internment in Gospić was the physical 
destruction of the interned, Gospić falls into the category of extermination 
camps (Vernichtungslager).40 Gospić and Lika were chosen as the location 
for such a camp for several reasons. They had a great symbolic significance 
for Croat extreme nationalism and for the Ustasha organisation itself. Ante 
37 “Zakonska odredba o ustaškoj nadzornoj službi”, Narodne novine no. 111, 26 Aug. 
1941; Zbornik zakona, 1941, 483. The Zbornik zakona published a second version of the 
law because the initial one, published in the Narodne novine no. 110, 25 Aug. 1941, gave 
UNS disproportionately broad powers, which met with opposition from other Ustasha 
structures. Jelić-Butić, Ustaše, 111–112; Lazić, “Organizacija”, 144–147.
38 “Odredba o osnivanju Ravnateljstva za javni red i sigurnost za Nezavisnu Državu 
Hrvatsku”, Zagreb, 4 May 1941, Narodne novine no. 21, 7 May 1941; Zbornik zakona, 
1941, 61; D. Lazić, “Organizacija policijsko-obaveštajne službe ‘Nezavisne Države Hr-
vatske’. Ravnateljstvo za javni mir i sigurnost”, Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske 6 (1972), 
184–189. 
39 “Zakonska odredba o državnoj vladi Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, Narodne novine 
no. 59, 25 April 1941; Zbornik zakona, 1941, 204–208. Under art. 5 of the law on the 
division of the ministries into departments and on the purview of the departments 
(Narodne novine no. 99, 11 Aug. 1941), RAVSIGUR was reattached to the Ministry 
of the Interior as one of its two departments but was not under direct authority of the 
minister; Zbornik zakona, 1941, 381–393. The law stipulated that RAVSIGUR collabo-
rate with UNS in all matters of public security, even though UNS was not established by 
law until a week later. In fact, RAVSIGUR was, as it were, the executive organ of UNS; 
Lazić, “Ravnateljstvo za javni mir i sigurnost”, 186–187, has a somewhat different view 
of the position of RAVSIGUR in relation to the Ministry of the Interior. 
40 Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, ed. Israel Gutman, s. v. “Extermination camps” (New 
York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1990), 461.
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Starčević and many prominent members of the Ustasha movement, includ-
ing Ante Pavelić, were natives of Lika. The Ustasha terrorist attack on the 
Yugoslav gendarmerie post in the village of Brušani, assisted by Italy (from 
Zadar), in 1932, had been mythologised and celebrated as “the Lika Up-
rising”. The Ustasha organisation had already had fairly strong footholds 
in Lika, and agrarian overpopulation and poverty combined with religious 
fanaticism and militarist tradition ensured fast mobilisation. Last but not 
least, a convenience for the planned destruction of Serbs was the karst ter-
rain of Mt Velebit with its many sinkholes suitable as mass execution sites. 
The importance of Gospić was emphasised by granting the municipality 
of Gospić the status of a city on 24 June 1941.41 On that same day, the 
largest camp in the Gospić system of camps was set up near the village of 
Jadovno, and a day later the Slana camp in the island of Pag received its first 
prisoners. 
In the Ustasha system of concentration camps whence the road led 
to Gospić were the camps in Koprivnica (“Danica” factory) and Zagreb 
(“Zagrebački zbor”, a fairground facility). Political opponents were mostly 
held in prisons (Kerestinec and Lepoglava).42 There were also smaller camps 
and temporary detention facilities (in Petrinja, Jablanica, Trebinje, Mostar, 
Sarajevo and Kruščica), where mass killings occasionally took place.43 As for 
the “final solution to the Jewish question” in pro-Nazi Croatia, it should be 
noted that the annihilation process was carried out in camps almost without 
exception. The Holocaust in the NDH began at the Gospić camp, was for 
the most part carried out at the Jasenovac camp, and was completed in the 
Nazi death camp of Auschwitz in August 1942 and May 1943.44 
The large-scale incarceration of Serbs and Jews was stepped up in 
the second half of June 1941, which coincided with the beginning of the 
war in the East and the propaganda campaign against Bolsheviks and their 
domestic following. To forestall mass protests expected to take place on St 
Vitus Day (28 June), the Serbian traditional holiday and historically im-
portant date, Croatian authorities made a mass arrest of hostages, mostly 
distinguished Serbs. Some were subsequently released, only to be become 
41 “Zakonska odredba o proglašenju općine Gospić gradom”, Narodne novine no. 58, 24 
June 1941; Zbornik zakona, 1941, 197. 
42 Peršen, Ustaški logori, 40–75.
43 Report of Major Nikola Mikec to State Directorate for Reconstruction, Zagreb, 7 
Aug. 1941, in Vukčević, ed., Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 473–475.
44 Holm Sundhaussen, “Jugoslawien; Der ‘Unabhägige Staat Kroatien’ (einschliesslich 
Dalmatiens)”, in Wolfgang Benz, ed., Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen 
Opfer des Nationalsozialismus (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 321–326.
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the target of repressive measures: they would be interned in camps or “go 
missing”.45 
All those measures, including internment in camps, were sanctioned 
by law. Two days before St Vitus Day, on 26 June 1941, an Extraordinary 
Legal Decree and Order of the Poglavnik was issued. It guaranteed the in-
violability of life and property to “a part of the population”, i.e. Serbs, with 
reference to the rumours that they would be subjected to persecution on 28 
June. Whoever should commit “any violence against the life or property of 
any citizen or member of the Independent State of Croatia” would be tried 
by courts-martial. That this was an attempt to pacify the Serbian revolt may 
be seen from the following provision: wherever “chetniks or remnants of the 
Serbian army” should appear, local authorities should promptly call upon 
the assistance of the gendarmerie, Ustasha units and, in the last resort, the 
Croatian army against them, using “cold weapons and firearms”.46
The law of 26 June 1941 was not directed only against the Serbs 
but also against the Jews. Its wording made use of standard anti-Semitic 
stereotypes about Jews spreading false news (a derivative of the accusation 
that the press was in Jewish hands and spread their destructive ideas) and 
preventing the supplying of the population by their speculative transactions. 
In line with the notion of collective responsibility, the Jews were declared 
guilty of those crimes as a group, and punished accordingly: by being sent 
to “open-air detention facilities”.47 
The importance that was attached to the decree of 26 June 1941 is 
obvious from the fact that an Order issued the same day by the interior 
minister Andrija Artuković required that its text be published on the front 
pages of newspapers for three days in a row, aired on the radio three times 
a day (in the morning, noon and evening), placarded in all towns, and an-
nounced in all municipalities. The order ended with a request of ecclesiasti-
cal authorities to convey the law “to spiritual shepherds“, i.e. priests.48 On 
the day of their promulgation the law and the order were published in the 
Katolički list (Catholic Newspaper) as well, accompanied by the archbishop 
Stepinac’s instruction to the parish priests “to make the above law known to 
people from the pulpit on the earliest occasion, that is, when the congrega-
45 Vukčević, ed., Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 233–290; S. Skoko, “Zločini 
genocida Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Hercegovini tokom 1941”, in R. Samardžić, 
ed., Genocid nad Srbima u II svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida & Srpska 
književna zadruga, 1995), 266–274; Krizman, NDH, 64.
46 “Izvanredna zakonska odredba i zapovjed”, Narodne novine no. 60, 26 June 1941; 
Zbornik zakona, 1941, 212–213.
47 Ibid. 
48 Zbornik zakona, 1941, 213.
M. Koljanin, The Role of Concentration Camps 329
tions gather in full attendance in church”.49 The role of the Roman Catholic 
Church in propagating the law ensured not only its dissemination but also 
its acceptance. The fact that the law was backed by the authority of the 
Church brings to light the latter’s role in the carrying out of state policies.
By the beginning of July 1941, the stated policy of destruction of the 
Jews had been largely put into effect. In that respect, the highest officials 
had been given clear instructions from the top. In his address to the county 
prefects and Ustasha functionaries of 30 June 1941, Pavelić announced the 
imminent elimination of the Jews from Croatian society: “Jews cannot and 
must not stay in our midst; amidst the Croatian people; for all the reasons 
known to you, including the reason that they have done so much wrong to 
the Croat people.”50 
By July 1941 the system of camps centred at Gospić had been fully 
operational and integrated into the destruction process. On 8 July 1941 
RAVSIGUR ordered all police departments that, when it should be re-
quired by the interest of public security, all “Greek-Easterners” (i.e. Serbs) 
and Jews be sent to the Gospić police department, i.e. to the camp of that 
department, and not any more to the camp “Danica” in Koprivnica. The 
order also applied to those who had converted to Roman Catholicism after 
10 April 1941.51 The destruction process was thus stepped up because now 
Serbs and Jews were sent directly to Gospić. From then on, the camp at 
Koprivnica served for the internment of opponents of the regime, political 
above all. 
The attitude of Ustasha authorities towards the communists tended 
to depend on their nationality. That it was so may be seen from the Ustasha 
police order of 23 July 1941 not to send Catholics and Muslims to Gospić,52 
which implies that to be sent to Gospić meant a death sentence. The Mus-
lim and Croat communists were exempted, at least temporarily, even though 
some groups of arrested communists were sent to Gospić nonetheless.53 
There followed new orders on sending Serbs to the Gospić concentration 
camp, both those intellectually prominent and those suspected, even if un-
proven guilty, of communist affiliation. The same applied to Jews. The arrest 
of Muslims and Croats of communist allegiance was still required, but they 
49 Katolički list no. 25, 26 June 1941, 285–286.
50 Poglavnik govori, vol. 2, 42.
51 VA, Fonds NDH, b. 180, no. 10-1.
52 VA, Fonds NDH, b. 189, no. 31/7-1, Circular letter of the Ustasha Police Directorate, 
Zagreb, 23 July 1941; Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 366. 
53 Kotar Gospić i kotar Perušić u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu 1941–1945 (Karlovac: His-
torijski arhiv Karlovac, 1989); Peršen, Ustaški logori, 53. 
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were to be detained in the place of arrest, while the Serbs and Jews were to 
be sent to Gospić straight away.54
Word about the existence of camps in Gospić, Jadovno and the is-
land of Pag, and about Serbs and Jews being killed there en masse, spread 
relatively fast. It was brought to occupied Serbia by refugees and exiles from 
Croatia. Based on their accounts, the Serbian Orthodox Church compiled 
an exhaustive memorandum and, in early August 1941, it was presented 
to the German Military Commander of Serbia, General Danckelmann. 
It contained comparatively detailed data about the camps at Gospić and 
Jadovno and about the terror and death suffered by Serbs in them.55 As the 
memorandum soon reached the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, 
and was published in the Amerikanski Srbobran (American Srbobran), the 
crimes that were being committed in the Gospić camp became known to a 
broader public. Presented with information about the mass incarceration of 
Jews in the camp in the island of Pag in early September 1941, the World 
Jewish Congress appealed to the Yugoslav government for help in reliev-
ing the situation of the imprisoned.56 Italian military representatives had 
much more detailed information about the concentration camps in Gospić 
and the island of Pag. Italian army commands reported in detail on mass 
and horrendous crimes against Serbs, but were under strict orders not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of their Croatian ally.57 The course of events, 
however, would soon compel them to make a radical change of policy.
The Roman Catholic Church and the archbishop Stepinac himself 
took an active part in promoting and propagating the law of 26 June 1941, 
the law which, among other things, provided for “open-air” internment. Yet, 
less than a month later, Stepinac reacted, in his own way, to the news of Serbs 
and Jews being, “occasionally”, mistreated during transportation to and in 
the camps. Without questioning the justifiability of the internment of the 
Serbs and Jews, including the children, the elderly and the sick, Stepinac’s 
letter to Pavelić of 21 July 1941 pleaded for a more “humane and consider-
ate way” of transportation to and treatment in the camps.58 Although the 
archbishop was no doubt aware of the mass expulsion and killing of priests 
54 VA, Fonds NDH, b. 169, no. 8/2, Circular letter of the Directorate for Public Order 
and Security, Zagreb, 23 July 1941.
55 VA, Fonds NDH, b. 312, no. 17/1; Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 594–625. 
56 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], Fonds (no. 371) Legation of 
Yugoslavia to the USA, 208, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
to Royal Legation in Washington, London, 18 Sept. 1941, conf. no. 6355.
57 Rodogono, Fascism’s European Empire, 186.
58 Fontes. Izvori za hrvatsku povijest, vol. 2 (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv, 1996), 266 
and 291.
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and monks of the Serbian Orthodox Church, seventy-two of whom were 
murdered in the Gospić camp alone, he had never stood up for them.
Different indicators of the structure of the imprisoned in the Gospić 
concentration camp make it possible to trace the dynamic of the destruction 
process and to identify some of its essential features. In the earliest period 
of its existence, most Serb prisoners were male, ranging in age from older 
boys to old men. By social status, they were predominantly members of the 
social elite. Most of the imprisoned Jews were youths, i.e. members of the 
community’s most vital part. In the second phase of the camp, from July to 
August 1941, all other categories of the Serbian population, women and 
children, were also interned, less so the Jews. This is corroborated by the 
statistics established by Djuro Zatezalo.
According to the research done by Djuro Zatezalo, of a total of 42,246 
persons deported to the Gospić camp as many as 40,123 (94.97%) were mur-
dered, of whom 38,010 (94.73%) were Serbs, 1,988 (4.95%) Jews and 155 
(0.28%) others. Of a total of 10,502 identified victims, 9,663 (92%) were 
Serbs of both sexes, including 1,014 children up to the age of fifteen. Among 
the 762 (7.25%) identified Jewish victims there were 15 children. It is in-
dicative that there were no children in the other groups of identified victims 
(77, or 0.74%).59 The most numerous of the latter groups were Croats (55, 
or 0.52%), who were victimised for their political allegiances, but these did 
not entail the internment of their family members. Unlike them, the Serbs 
and Jews were subjected to total destruction as collectives, which explains the 
presence of women and children in those two groups of prisoners.
The list of identified victims,60 however incomplete, permits some 
conclusions as regards the dynamic of the destruction process in some re-
gions of the Ustasha state. The largest number of victims came from the re-
gion of Lika, and the part of it which was in relative proximity to the camp 
itself. Of the total of 10,502 victims, 4,335 (41.28%) came from Lika, most-
ly from Gospić/Perušić District, followed by the districts of Korenica, Ogu-
lin and Otočac. The number of victims from Donji Lapac District, where 
Serbs accounted for the vast majority of the population, was conspicuously 
small. In the course of July 1941, Ustasha and Croatian army units joined by 
armed Croat and Muslim peasants were systematically destroying the Ser-
bian population of this district in order to break up the continuous ethnic 
area that it formed with neighbouring Bosanska Krajina. From 1 July to 10 
August 1941, in this and adjacent districts 3,500 persons, mostly women, 
59 Djuro Zatezalo, Jadovno. Kompleks ustaških logora 1941, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava 
genocida, 2007), 373.
60 Ibid. 422–732. The author specifies the names of the identified 10,502 victims, as well 
as the place of residence and the place and time of violent death.
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children and elderly, were killed in a most cruel way. In early August 1941, 
560 Serbs from Smiljan, the native village of Serbian-American inventor 
Nikola Tesla, were slaughtered. It was in the area of Donji Lapac and Bo-
sanska Krajina that a mass uprising broke out on 27 July 1941, spreading 
fast to the neighbouring Serb-inhabited areas.61 
Nor was western Slavonia spared, notably Grubišino Polje, Pakrac and 
Križevci, with its 985 (9.38%) identified victims. From the regions of Banija 
and Kordun, including the towns of Sisak and Karlovac, there were 879 vic-
tims (8.73%), followed by Zagreb (460), Mostar (440), Bosanska Krupa (201), 
Travnik (188), Sarajevo (179), Slavonski Brod (150), and other places.
It is obvious that the destruction process in the NDH, apart from 
urban areas, towns and cities, targeted ethnically compact Serbian areas, in 
particular Lika and western Slavonia. There were also local destruction cen-
tres, and most Serbs from a particular region were killed there without ever 
being transported to Gospić. The number of victims from the Cazin (104) 
and Bihać (43) areas is markedly small, which may be explained by the 
fact that the destruction of local Serbs was carried out mostly in those two 
towns and their environs (execution sites Garavice, Mehino Stanje etc.), 
and with a mass participation of local Muslim population.62 Much the same 
goes for the regions of Banija and Kordun from where a relatively small 
number of people were sent to Gospić. The largest regional destruction cen-
tre was Glina and its environs.63
The Gospić concentration camp occupied a central place in the initial 
phase of the extermination of the Jews (Holocaust). The first to be targeted 
were the largest Jewish communities, above all the Zagreb one: of the 762 
identified Jewish victims, nearly one half, 369 (48.42%), came from Zagreb. 
The communities of Karlovac and Križevci suffered stronger blows relative 
to their size (45 and 33 victims respectively). It is indicative that the large 
Jewish community in Sarajevo was not yet targeted, as shown by a total of 
25 identified victims.
Even though the only purpose of the Gospić camp was the carrying 
out of the destruction programme, i.e. incarceration and killing, a germ of 
yet another purpose of the Ustasha camps began to take shape. Under the 
strict watch of Ustasha guards, internees from the camp facility known as 
61 Gojko Vezmar, Ustaško-okupatorski zločini u Lici 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava 
genocida, 2005), 152–182.
62 VA, Fonds NDH, b. 153a, no. 23/1-1, Report of the Ministry of the Interior of the 
NDH, 10 Aug. 1941; ibid., Ministry of the Interior of the NDH to the Ministry of 
Justice and Religion, 24 Sept. 1941.
63 Djuro Aralica, Ustaški pokolji Srba u glinskoj crkvi (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 
2010); Pero Drakulić, Korak do smrti (Zagreb: Srpsko narodno vijeće, 2014), 18–45.
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Ovčara (seized property of the Serbian Maksimović family), mostly women 
and children, worked in the fields of the Serb owners who had been either 
murdered or managed to flee. Some prisoners, mostly Jews, crushed stone 
on the road or swept the streets in Gospić.64 
Speaking of the camps where the policy was being put into effect of 
mass destruction of ethnic, religious, national and racial groups within the 
“New Order of Europe” under the dominance of Nazi Germany, the Gospić 
concentration camp had priority. The beginning of the “crusade” against the 
Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 marked the beginning of the mass and sys-
tematic killing of Jews on occupied territories,65 ushering in the last and 
most horrible phase of the Holocaust: extermination. It was unleashed in 
its full magnitude at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, when death 
camps in occupied Poland were set in operation one after another.66 In the 
NDH the Holocaust had by then been for the most part completed, in ac-
cordance with the available means and resources of the Ustasha state. The 
NDH’s manufacture of death centred at Gospić, and from August 1941 at 
the concentration camp of Jasenovac, had preceded Nazi Germany’s indus-
try of death centred in occupied Poland.
As the Serbian uprising was growing in number, as of 15 August 
1941 the Italian High Command began the reoccupation of a consider-
able part of the NDH (“Zone II”), where the Gospić camp was located.67 
As a result, Ustasha authorities were compelled to dissolve the camps in 
the island of Pag and Gospić, and on 19 August 1941 the prisoners were 
transferred to a makeshift camp at Jastrebarsko. On 2 September the Jew-
ish and Serbian women and children were transferred from Jastrebarsko 
to the Kruščica camp near Travnik, and thence to the Loborgrad camp in 
Hrvatsko Zagorje.68 The Jewish and Serb male internees were transported 
from Jastrebarsko to the Jasenovac railway station, and thence to the newly-
established camp near the village of Krapje. That was the first in the Jaseno-
vac system of camps, and it was designated as Camp I. Preparations for 
64 Zatezalo, Jadovno, vol. 1, 155 and 162–163.
65 Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 
217–259.
66 Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: The Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939–
1945 (New York: Harper Collins Pub., 2008), 294–560.
67 Dragan Nenezić, Jugoslovenske oblasti pod Italijom 1941–1943 (Belgrade: Vojnoistori-
jski institut VJ, 1999), 98–101; H. James Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic. Mussolini’s 
Conquest of Yugoslavia 1941–1943 (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 72–75. 
68 Zločini fašističkih okupatora i njihovih pomagača protiv Jevreja u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade: 
Savez jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije, 1952), 74–76; Nada Trninić Šević, U ustaškim logo-
rima (Novi Sad, Petrovaradin: Alfagraf, 2004), 29–65.
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its establishing had begun on 24 July 1941 at the latest, which is the date 
when the Amelioration Directorate made an order for timber “for build-
ing wooden barracks in Jasenovac”.69 At the same time or soon afterwards, 
yet another camp, Camp II, was set up near the village of Bročice. Only 
a month later, on 23 August 1941, the daily Hrvatski narod reported the 
completion of the barracks for workers who would be draining Lonjsko 
Polje. As it turned out soon enough, drainage work was just a front for the 
mass torture and killing of the imprisoned.
Command over the camps at Krapje and Bročice was headquartered 
in the village of Jasenovac, and every camp had its own command structure 
as well. The camps were guarded by members of the same Ustasha units that 
had guarded the Gospić camp. The Krapje and Bročice camps soon began 
to receive new groups of arrestees from various part of the NDH. Apart 
from Jews and Serbs, among them were also Croat communists and other 
antifascists.70 In October 1941 the number of prisoners rose to between 
4,000 and 5,000. The living and working conditions were horrendous. The 
prisoners building a levee along the river Strug were given only most primi-
tive tools to work with, and many of them were killed on the site or died 
from exhaustion and diseases which soon began to spread. The situation was 
aggravated by heavy rains and the locations of the camps were threatened 
by floods.71 
A new concentration camp began to be set up in the east part of pre-
dominantly Serb-inhabited Jasenovac on 20 October 1941. Prisoners from 
Bročice were taken daily to the site to build the fence and the levee. The 
camp made use of the buildings on the seized estate of the Serbian Bačić 
family which consisted of a large brickyard, sawmill, flour mill and chain 
factory. The transfer of prisoners from Krapje and Bročice to the newly-
established camp was preceded by a large-scale killing. Thus, the number 
of prisoners transferred by 20 November was not greater than about 1,500 
people. The estimated total deaths in those two camps range between 8,000 
and 12,000 people.72
The camp at Jasenovac itself was known as Camp III (Ciglana, “Brick-
yard”) or Concentration Camp III. It was to become the largest camp in the 
69 Nataša Mataušić, Jasenovac 1941–1945. Logor smrti i radni logor ( Jasenovac – Zagreb: 
Spomen područje Jasenovac, 2003), 30.
70 Ilija Jakovljević, Konclogor na Savi (Zagreb: Konzor, 1999), passim.
71 Zločini u logoru Jasenovac (Zagreb: Zemaljska komisija Hrvatske za utvrdjivanje 
zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, 1946), 4 and 40–41. 
72 Antun Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941–1945. Dokumenta, vol. I (Bel-
grade: Narodna knjiga & Jasenovac: Spomen područje Jasenovac, 1986), 20; and vol. II, 
898–900. 
M. Koljanin, The Role of Concentration Camps 335
Ustasha system of camps, assigned to play the central role in pursuing the 
NDH’s repressive policies. It was conveniently located near main routes and 
connected with the Zagreb–Belgrade railway by an industrial branch line. 
The river Sava ran just past it and the confluence of the Una and Sava rivers 
was not far away. Being set up in a flat floodplain, it was relatively easy to 
secure. Moreover, strong military and police forces were stationed compara-
tively near. On top of all that, the camp was near the main Serb-inhabited 
areas, and in the vicinity of cities where most of the Jewish population was 
concentrated.
The organisation of the concentration camp at Jasenovac was ac-
companied by setting up the Command Headquarters of Concentration 
Camps as part of the Ustasha Defence, i.e. of the 3rd Office of the Usta-
sha Supervisory Service. The camp’s official name, the one on its seal, was 
“Ustasha Defence, Command of Jasenovac Concentration Camps”. In fact, 
the camp was hybrid in nature because its two main purposes were the de-
struction of undesirable population groups and the use of slave workforce, 
which amounted to destruction by backbreaking labour. In that respect, 
Jasenovac was no different from large German concentration camps, nota-
bly Auschwitz, which had the same purpose. Since the camp’s main purpose 
was destruction, it may be classified as concentration and/or extermination 
camp.73
During the setting up of Camp III at Jasenovac, the question of in-
ternment was “legally” regulated:74 the Legal Decree on Forced Confinement 
of Objectionable and Dangerous Persons in Concentration and Labour Camps 
of 25 November 1941 specified in detail who was to be sent to a camp and 
for how long, which authority was responsible for establishing camps and 
deciding on internment in a camp, and who was responsible for internal 
organisation in a camp. Quite in line with the earlier Ustasha legislation, 
notably with the Legal Decree on the Defence of People and State of 17 April 
1941, it specified which authority was responsible for setting up, and send-
ing to, camps: “Objectionable persons who are a danger to public order and 
security or who might endanger the peace of mind and tranquillity of the 
Croat people or the accomplishments of the liberation struggle of the Croat 
Ustasha movement may be subject to forced internment in concentration 
or labour camps. Authorised to set up these camps in particular places in 
73 Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 337 and 495. Evans, Third Reich at War, 159, clas-
sifies the Ustasha camps as concentration camps, but notes that their role was not to 
confine opponents of the regime, but to destroy ethnic and religious minorities. At any 
rate, the camp at Jasenovac cannot be classified as a “death and labour camp” as it is in 
Mataušić, Jasenovac.
74 Zbornik zakona, 1941, 868–869; Narodne novine no. 188, 25 Nov. 1941.
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the Independent State of Croatia is the Ustasha Supervisory Service.” Even 
though the camps had been under the administration of Ustasha police and 
military forces from the very inception of the NDH, it was only in this law 
that the central role of the Ustasha police and security apparatus in estab-
lishing and managing the camps was expressly mentioned. 
The length of internment as specified by the law was not less than 
three months and not more than three years, but the head of the Ustasha 
Supervisory Service, the Ustasha supervisory commander, was authorised to 
shorten it at any time. That the latter provision had only a nominal and 
propaganda character may be seen from other sources which show that in-
ternment was frequently prolonged and practically never shortened. Those 
subjected to three years of forced internment were usually murdered im-
mediately upon arriving in the camp, and the same fate would soon befall 
most of the others.75
It is obvious from the law that the whole procedure, from arrest, de-
tainment and interrogation to internment decision, was in the hands of 
the Ustasha police, and that it was to them that all bodies of authority 
were to report all persons liable to internment under the law. Even though 
the law required that a prior interment decision be issued by the police, 
ample sources show that huge numbers of people, above all Serbs, Jews 
and Roma, were deported to the concentration camp of Jasenovac and im-
mediately executed without any prior police decision.76 Just as the Ustasha 
police had in their hands all matters preceding the internment, which can 
be seen from the law, so the Ustasha Defence had in its hands all matters 
following the arrival of internees in a camp, which cannot be seen from the 
law. The person responsible for the enforcement of this law was the head of 
UNS, Ustasha supervisory commander Eugen Kvaternik, which means that 
he was directly carrying out the state policy of terror. His main tool was the 
Ustasha Defence, i.e. the 3rd Office of UNS, which administered all camps 
of the Ustasha state.77 
With the enactment of the law on interment in camps, the procedure 
for the treatment of undesirable groups, from arrest to execution in camps, 
became fully regulated. The whole procedure was in the hands of two ex-
ecutive institutions, RAVSIGUR and UNS, whose head, Eugen Kvaternik, 
was directly answerable to the head of state himself, Poglavnik Ante Pavelić. 
What seems to follow as an inevitable conclusion is that the policy of ex-
termination of the Serbs, Jews and Roma was shaped by the very top of the 
75 Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, vol. I, 30. 
76 Ibid.
77 Lazić, “Organizacija”, 176–177; Jelić-Butić, Ustaše, 185; Miletić, Koncentracioni logor 
Jasenovac, vol. I, 17.
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Croatian fascist state and pursued under its direct control. All mechanisms, 
from institutional to legal, necessary for carrying out that genocidal policy 
were set in place in the course of 1941, and the central role in it was assigned 
to extermination camps, at first at Gospić and then, from the autumn of 
1941 until the end of the war and the Ustasha state, at Jasenovac. 
The exact number of people murdered at Jasenovac has never been 
reliably established, nor has a serious effort ever been made to do that. Yet, 
the historians who rely on contemporary sources have no doubts that the 
number amounts to hundreds of thousands of victims. Even though the 
sources usually provide estimates for the total number of victims in the 
NDH,  Serbian above all, there is no doubt that most victims were mur-
dered at Jasenovac. As early as the end of summer 1941 German military 
and police authorities had estimates of about 200,000 murdered Serbs in 
the NDH.78 In October 1942 the German Plenipotentiary General in the 
NDH Edmund Glaise von Horstenau described Jasenovac as the most hor-
rible concentration camp in the NDH in which thousands and thousands 
of its citizens were being murdered.79 In his memorandum of 27 February 
1943 the Commander-in-Chief in the South-East Alexander Löhr quot-
ed the Ustasha figure of about 400,000 murdered Orthodox Christians in 
the NDH.80 In his report to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler of mid-
March 1944, Waffen-SS Major-General Ernst Fick stated that the Croat 
party troops Ustashas were known for having murdered in the most cruel 
way between 600,000 and 700,000 persons of different religious and po-
litical affiliations.81 Hermann Neubacher, Special Plenipotentiary envoy of 
the Reich’s Foreign Ministry in the South-East, based on available reports, 
estimated the number of Serb civilians cruelly slaughtered in the NDH by 
1944 at 750,000 people.82 According to an estimate recently put forth in 
historiography, in the Jasenovac camp were murdered about 300,000 Serbs, 
30,000 Jews and most of the Roma population of the NDH.83  
UDC 323.12:329.18](497.5)”1941/1945”
          341.322.5:341.485
78 Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, vol. IV, 129. 
79 Glez fon Horstenau, Izmedju Hitlera i Pavelića (Memoari kontroverznog generala) (Bel-
grade: Nolit, 2007), 527 (Serb. ed. of Ein General im Zwielicht, ed. P. Broucek (Böhlau 
Verlag, 1980–88). 
80 Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1964), 146–147. 
81 VA, Fonds Na, Microfilm NAW, T-175, roll 70, frames 888–890. 
82 Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost. 1940–1945. Bericht eines fliegenden Diplo-
maten (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956), 128. 
83 Evans, The Third Reich, 160. 
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